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NOTES
gree comparable to the federal income "operational" test since it is
the operation which determines whether the charity is in fact a
"guise." Finally, the federal income "unrelated business" test is at
least a partial counterpart to the property "use" test. Only that
part of a charity which is deemed "unrelated business" is subject
to income tax, the remainder retaining its exemption. Likewise, only
that segment of the property not used for the charitable purpose will
be taxed, the remainder again retaining its exemption.
)X
THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER IN FELONY-MURDER
AND MISDEMEANOR-MANSLAUGHTER
Early common law grouped homicide cases as (1) justifiable,
(2) excusable, and (3) felonious.' In other words, all homicide
which was not justifiable nor excusable was felonious.2 Every feloni-
ous killing, without further refinement into murder or manslaughter,
was punishable by death; 3 while on the other hand, benefit of clergy
attached even if it was a killing of the most atrocious nature.4
However, during the period from 1496 to 1547, a series of stat-
utes excluded from benefit of clergy certain of the more serious forms
of felonious homicide, referring to them as murder committed with
malice aforethought. 5 Felonious homicide was then divided into two
main categories: that which was committed with malice aforethought,
and that which was not. The former was called murder and punish-
able by death, the latter became manslaughter and was punishable by
branding and imprisonment not to exceed one year.8 Express malice
was defined by Blackstone as "malice . . . when one, with a sedate
deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill another: which formed
design is evidenced by external circumstances discovering that inward
intention; as lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and
concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm." 7 Malice afore-
12 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 483-84 (1895).
23 HoLDSwoRTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 314 (3d ed. 1927).
32 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 450-60.
4 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 44 (1883).
5 See Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J.
537, 543 (1934). This work is an excellent and extensive study of malice
aforethought. According to the author, aforethought (prepense) was used in
the sense of a design meditated upon for a substantial period of time in advance.
Id. at 544.
7 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *199. The words "express" or "implied"
do not add to the meaning of malice; they are not two separate kinds of malice,
but merely signify the manner in which the only kind known to the law may
be shown to exist.
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thought is a "subjective condition of the mind" s and may "be in-
ferred from acts committed." 9 All homicide was presumed to have
been committed with malice aforethought unless the proof offered
by the state or by the defendant tended to reduce the offense to man-
slaughter or show that the defendant's act was justified or excusable.' 0
This presumption was rebuttable, yet it put upon the defendant the
burden of coming forward with the evidence. If the defendant failed
to rebut the presumption (the unrebutted evidence of the commission
of the homicide was also presumptive evidence of its commission with
malice aforethought), the jury could find him guilty of murder in
the first or second degree.
The common-law view found malice aforethought-whether
"express" or "implied"-to be present whenever there was an intent
to kill " or to inflict grievous bodily harm 12 devoid of justification,
excuse, or some special circumstance of mitigation. This occurred
whether or not the intent was focused on the actual victim or upon
some other.' 3 In connection with this approach, it was obvious that
certain felonies were so frequently attended with death or grievous
bodily harm that the felon was charged with the state of mind evi-
denced by his wanton act, regardless of the possible absence of an
actual intent to cause death or harm. With regard to homicide re-
sulting from such felonies, it was unnecessary to show in a specific
case a plain and strong likelihood that death or grievous bodily harm
would result. This type of homicide was regarded, as was homicide
done with actual intent to kill, as "murder with malice aforethought"
-the malice here being constructive rather than express. This type
of homicide is called felony-murder.
As previously mentioned, the felony concerned with constructive
malice had to be dangerous; in addition, the homicide must have been
done in furtherance of the felony. Most common-law felonies, with
the exception of larceny,14 were directed either toward death or
grievous bodily harm, or involved a substantial risk of this nature.
Even if the felony itself did not involve any element of risk to human
life, the criminal could employ a dangerous force to complete the
crime or deter others from interfering. Whether the felony was in-
8 State v. Hamrick, 112 W. Va. 157, 166, 163 S.E. 868, 873 (1932).
9 Stevens v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 154, 173, 59 S.W. 545, 549 (1900).
10 Miranda v. State, 26 P.2d 241, 243 (Ariz. 1933).
11 State v. Pasour, 183 N.C. 793, 111 S.E. 779 (1922).
12 State v. Calabrese, 107 N.J.L. 115, 151 Atl. 781 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
13 This rule was established early in the common law. See 3 CoKE,
INSTITUTES 51 (6th ed. 1680). Thus if A intentionally shoots at B and misses
him, but instead kills C undesignedly, he is guilty of murder at common law.
Actual intent to kill could be inferred from these facts. However, if intent
to kill was not inferred the defendant could still be found gu:lty of murder,
upon a finding of an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm.
14 See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *205-19.
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herently dangerous or the method used was dangerous, any killing
perpetrated therein was murder. 15
In addition, homicide resulting from resistance to a lawful arrest
was considered as murder with malice aforethought.' 6 This was
rationalized by stating that one who was resisting a proper, lawful
arrest acted without justification, excuse or provocation, and there-
fore, the resistor's use of a deadly force constituted malice afore-
thought.' 7 Also, resistance to lawful arrest almost always involves
an element of risk of death or grievous bodily harm.
All cases of malice aforethought therefore involved substantial
risk to human life, including intent to kill, intent to inflict grievous
bodily harm, or an intent to commit an act under such circumstances
that there was an obvious likelihood that death or harm would
result.' 8 The latter classification concerns felony-murder and re-
sistance to lawful arrest.
As previously noted, after the latter part of the fourteenth cen-
tury all homicide committed with "malice aforethought" constituted
murder; all others, with the exception of excusable or justifiable
homicide, were manslaughter. Manslaughter at common law was
defined by Hale as the "voluntary killing of another without malice
express or implied, and differs not in substance of the fact from
murder, but only differs in [several] . . . circumstances." '9 The
rule governing homicide committed in the course of an unlawful act
has been definitely modified since Coke first declared that "if the act
be unlawful, it is murder." 20 Foster, admittedly contrary to Coke,
stated that accidental homicide caused by unlawful acts was murder
if the unlawful acts were felonies; killings attendant upon unlawful
acts other than felonies were manslaughter. 21 Felonious homicide
which was not murder was known as homicide by chance-medley,
and later as manslaughter.2 2 Foster restricted his unlawful acts,
felonies or otherwise, to malum in se offenses.
23
A more recent definition is that common-law involuntary man-
slaughter is death resulting unintentionally from an unlawful act not
15 See State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (Ct. Err. & App. 1833). The court
stated here that death resulting from a felony is murder and added "especially
if death were a probable consequence of the act." Id. at 370.
16 See Floyd v. State, 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 683 (1886).
17 See White v. State, 70 Miss. 253, 11 So. 632 (1892).
is Regina v. Porter, 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 444 (1873).
19 1 HALtz PLEAS OF THE CROWN 466 (1800). Of the four circumstances
enumerated by Hale, only one has significance here. "1. In the degree of the
offense, murder being aggravated with malice presumed or implied, but man-
slaughter not, and therefore in manslaughter there can be no accessories before."
Ibid. For examples of manslaughter at common law, see id. at 475 (1800).
20 3 CoxE, INsTrTUTEs 56 (6th ed. 1680).
2 1 Fos;mz, CROWN LAW 258 (1762).
22 3 HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 314 (3d ed. 1927).
23 See note 21 sutpra.
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amounting to a felony or from a lawful act negligently performed; 24
the former is presently known as misdemeanor-manslaughter and the
latter as negligent manslaughter.2 5 Constructive intent from the com-
mission of a misdemeanor was utilized in this area as it was in murder.
The New York Statutory Classification of Homicide
In 1829, the Revised Statutes,2 6 containing the first codification
of the law of homicide in New York, divided homicide into murder,2 7
manslaughter,28 excusable homicide, 29 and justifiable homicide.30 The
common-law terminology of "malice" and "aforethought" were re-
placed by "design" and "premeditated."
Murder was defined in one section containing three subdivisions.
Manslaughter was divided into four degrees. The main distinction
between murder and manslaughter was intent to kill which was pres-
ent in the former and absent in the latter.81
The failure of the Revised Statutes to provide a separate cate-
gory with a more lenient penalty for unpremeditated-intentional kill-
ings caused the legislature in 1860 to divide murder into two degrees.32
In this statute, the qualified felonies under the felony-murder pro-
vision were specifically stated as the commission or attempt to commit
arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, and constituted murder in the first
degree. This statute, however, was short-lived; it was repealed in
1862.33 The Act of 1862 reinstated the original language of 1829,
i.e., "premeditated design to effect the death." The two divisions of
murder continued. At this point, all felony-murder, which had been
murder in the first degree, was classified as murder in the second
degree, with the exception of arson. Second degree murder, however,
2 4 WHARTON, HOMICIDE § 6 (2d ed. 1875).
25 See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1052(3).
26 N.Y. Rtv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1.
27 N.Y. REv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 1; Art. 1, §5.
28 N.Y. REv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, §§ 6-19.29 N.Y. Rzv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, § 4.3 0 N.Y. REV. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, § 2.
32 N.Y. REv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, §§ 6, 10, 12. The
phrase used was "without design to effect death." The sole exceptions were§ 7 (aiding suicide), § 8 (wilful killing of an unborn quick child) and, perhaps,§ 11 (using excessive or unnecessary force in self-defense).
32 Laws of New York, 1860, ch. 410, at 712: "All murder which shall be
perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of
wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in
the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or
burglary, or in any attempt to escape from imprisonment, shall be deemed
murder of the first degree, and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed
murder in the second degree. . . ." No test was laid down for determining
what acts constituted murder in the second degree.
3 Laws of New York, 1862, ch. 197, at 368-69.
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with the exception of felony-murder, remained a negative, unclear
provision.
The desire of the legislature to narrow the field of capital homi-
cides-defeated in 1860 and again in 1862-was brought to fruition
in 1873 with the first affirmative definition of second degree murder.
In this statute of 1873, felony-murder reappeared as murder in the
first degree in the following form: "[W]hen perpetrated without
any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of
any felony." 3-
The legislature, in 1881, enacted the final statutory change in the
definition of murder.3 5 With the exception of a slight change in the
phrasing of murder in the second degree, the provisions of the Act
of 1873 were merely re-enacted. These intentional homicide provi-
sions were retained in the Penal Law 36 and remain to the present day.
Under the Revised Statutes, a system of four gradations was
superimposed upon the general categories of common-law man-
slaughter. An attempt was made to divide each common-law category
into its component parts and to distribute the segments among the
appropriate degrees of manslaughter.
The system of degrees adopted by the Revisers necessitated meta-
physical inquiry into the relative culpability in each type of man-
slaughter. The "unlawful act" category, which would constitute
murder at common law, was resolved into: (1) homicide in the course
of felonies, becoming murder; 37 (2) homicide in the course of mis-
demeanors, becoming manslaughter in the first degree; 3s (3) homi-
cide in the course of private wrongs, becoming manslaughter in the
third degree.3 9
Homicides committed in the heat of passion were classified as:
(1) murder when an intent to kill existed; 40 (2) manslaughter in
the second degree when committed "in a cruel and unusual manner"
but without an intent to kill; 41 (3) manslaughter in the third degree
34 Laws of New York, 1873, ch. 664, at 1014: "Such killing, unless it be
manslaughter or excusable or justifiable homicide, as hereinafter provided, shall
be murder in the first degree, in the following cases: [The first and second
situations covered premeditated and depraved mind murder.] . . . . Third,
when perpetrated without any design to effect death by a person engaged in
the commission of any felony. Such killing, unless it be murder in the first
degree, or manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide, as hereinafter
provided, shall Be murder in the second degree when perpetrated intentionally
but without deliberation and premeditation." (Emphasis added.) The above
section concerning felony-murder was stated in the same manner in 1876.
Laws of New York, 1876, ch. 333, at 317.
35 3 Laws of New York 1881, ch. 676, §§ 183, 184, 186, 187.36 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1044.
37 See note 27, supra. See also text accompanying note 15 supra.3sN.Y. RFv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, § 6.3 9 N.Y. REv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, § 13.
40 See note 31 supra.41 N.Y. REv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, § 10.
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when committed with a dangerous weapon but without an intent to
kill.42 Homicide committed in the course of an unlawful performance
of a lawful act, i.e., in the course of a negligent act, became man-
slaughter in the fourth degree. 43
The number of degrees of manslaughter was reduced from four
to two with the enactment of the Penal Code in 1881 but the content
of the four degrees was retained within the two. Manslaughter in
the first and second degree retained its separate identity but was
classified as manslaughter in the first degree. The homicide previ-
ously grouped as manslaughter in the third and fourth degree was
termed manslaughter in the second degree. This scheme has been
continued down to the present time.44
With respect to the statutory derivation of misdemeanor-
manslaughter, the Revised Statutes in 1829 stated:
The killing of a human being, without a design to effect death, by the act,
procurement or culpable negligence of any other, while such is engaged,
1. In the perpetration of any crime or misdemeanor not amounting to felony:
or, 2. In an attempt to perpetrate any such crime or misdemeanor, in cases
where such killing would be murder at common law, shall be deemed man-
slaughter in the first degree.45
It would appear that the intention of the Revisers was to insure
that death-causing unlawful acts which were not felonies would not
constitute murder. The desire to further limit qualifying misde-
meanors was displayed when the Penal Code in 1881 46 expressed
the same terminology as used presently, namely:
Such homicide is manslaughter in the first degree, when committed without
a design to effect death: 1. By a person engaged in committing or attempting
to commit, a misdemeanor, affecting the person or property, either of the
person killed, or of another. ... 47
If the felony-murder provision in first degree murder had con-
tinued as set forth in the Laws of 1860, with specifically enumerated
qualifying felonies, there would be no debatable issue in this area.
The felonious homicide would simply qualify under the statute or it
would not. This is the situation in the majority of American juris-
dictions.48 However, since New York and five similar jurisdictions 49
42 N.Y. REv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, § 12.
43 N.Y. REv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, § 19.44 N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1050, 1052.
4 N.Y. REv. STAT. (1829) Pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2; Art. 1, § 6.
4 3 Laws of New York, 1881, ch. 676, § 189(1).4 7 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1050(1).
48 See survey, note 49 infra.
49 A survey of the United States revealed that five states have felony-
murder statutes similar to New York. Homicide perpetrated by a person en-
gaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit any felony is murder
in the highest degree. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-401 (1949); N.M. STAT.
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ANN. § 40-24-4 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953); OKLA. STAT. AxN.
tit. 21, § 701 (1951) ; S.D. CODE § 13.2007 (1939).
The District of Columbia and Hawaii have similar statutes, but the
Hawaiian law refers to homicides committed in the perpetration of a felony
which is punishable by life imprisonment, not subject to parole. D.C. CODE
ANN. §22-2401 (1951) and HAWAII REv. LAws §291-3 (Supp. 1957).
Wisconsin makes such killing in the commission of any felony murder in the
third degree. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (1958). In Minnesota, certain enu-
merated felonies (rape, assault to commit rape, indecent assault and sodomy)
when combined with homicide are murder in the second degree. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 619.08 (Supp. 1959).
Most American jurisdictions reserve their severest pun:shments for homi-
cides perpetrated in the commission of specified felonies. Lesser felonies con-
stitute murder in the second or third degree or manslaughter. The "most
popular" felonies are arson, rape, robbery and burglary. ALA. CoDE tit. 14,
§ 314 (1940); ALASKA Co tp. LAWS ANN. § 65-4-1 (Supp. 1958); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-3401 (1956) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (1954) ; Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 2215 (1942); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-401 (1956); NE\'. REV. STAT. § 200.030
(Supp. 1959); OHIO Ray. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Baldwin 1959); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 163.010 (Supp. 1957); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-1 (1956); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-30-3 (1953); VT. STAT. A-N. tit. 13, § 2301 (1958); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18-30 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5916 (1955); Wyo. Comtp.
STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (1957).
Nine states add mayhem to their lists. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-452
(1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 189; COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-3 (1953);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4003 (1947); IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.2 (1946); MD.
ANN. CODE art 27, § 410 (1957) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.010 (1949) ; MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. § 94-2503 (1947); N.D. RFv. CODE § 12-2712 (1943). Six
states include kidnapping. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (Supp. 1959); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-4003 (1947) ; LA. REv. STAT. § 14:30 (1950) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4701 (1950); N.J. REV. STAT. §2A:113-1 (1951); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 585:1 (1955). Three states add larceny. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2205
(1947); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402 (1955); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.48.030
(Supp. 1956). Three other states include sodomy. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 410 (1957) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 12-2712 (1943) ; N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-1
(1951). Connecticut adds killing by means of explosive compound. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53-9 (1958).
Kentucky, Maine, South Carolina and Texas make no specific reference
to felony-murder, but it appears to be included within the meaning of "w.lful
murder" and common-law homicide. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 435.010 (1955);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 130, § 1 (1954); S.C. CODE § 16-51 (1952); TEX.
PEN. CODE art 1256 (1948).
Georgia and Illinois mention no specific felony-murder statute, but case
law has included the "popular" felonies within their homicide statutes. GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1002 (1953) and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 358 (Smith-Hurd
1934).
In Delaware, murder in the first degree covers only homicides which occur
in the commission of, or in attempt to commit, crimes punishable with death
(rape, kidnapping and treason). DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 571 (Supp. 1958).
Massachusetts includes crimes punishable with death or life imprisonment.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (1956).
The punishment for felony-murder in the majority of American jurisdic-
tions is death or life imprisonment, with the exceptions of Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Texas and Illinois. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (1958) (Maximum
sentence cannot exceed fifteen years over that provided by law for the felony.) ;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 619.08 (1959) (punishment not less than fifteen years
nor more than forty years, except felonies of rape, assault, indecent assault,
sodomy, where the maximum punishment is life imprisonment); TEX. PEN.
1960 ]
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do not specify the applicable felonies, problems of interpretation often
arise.
The felony-murder area, however, is subject to much less inter-
pretation than is necessary in misdemeanor-manslaughter. This is
readily understandable when one contemplates the Penal Law and
the number and diversity of our misdemeanors. The problem of de-
termining which misdemeanors "affect the person, or property of the
person killed, or of another," as opposed to those that "affect society
in general," which misdemeanors merge and which do not, which mis-
demeanors are malum in se and which are nialuin prohibitum, is huge.
Other states circumvent this problem by following the common law
or by enacting general "unlawful act" misdemeanor-manslaughter
provisions. °
CODE art. 1257 (1948) (Minimum punishment is two years, maximum is life
imprisonment or death.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 360 (Smith-Hurd 1934)(punishment no less than fourteen years to life imprisonment or death).
60 A survey of the United States revealed that six states have misdemeanor-
manslaughter statutes similar to those in New York. Homicide committed by
a person engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit a misdemeanor
is manslaughter in the highest degree. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §21-407
(1949); LA. Rnv. STAT. § 14:31 (1950); N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2717 (1943);
OxiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 711 (1951) ; WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.48.060 (1951) ;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 619.15 (1959). This statute is identical with that in New
York. Mississippi has a similar statute, but they divide manslaughter into
three parts. Homicide committed by a person engaged in, or attempting to
commit any felony except rape, burglary, arson or robbery is manslaughter.
Miss. CoDE ANN. § 2215 (1942). Homicide committed during the commission
of, or attempt to commit a misdemeanor, § 2221, and in the commission of, or
attempt to commit any unlawful act, § 2225, is also classified as manslaughter.
Eleven states define manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter as the un-
intentional killing in the commission of an unlawful act. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 41-2209 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-7 (1953); GA. CODE ANN.§ 26-1009 (1953); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 363 (Smith-Hurd 1934); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 10-3405 (1956); MONT. Ray. CODE ANN. § 94-2507 (1947);
NE. REV. STAT. § 28-404 (1943); Nav. REv. STAT. § 200.040 (1959); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 163.040 (1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-2409 (1955); Wyo.
CoMp. STAT. ANN. § 6-58 (1957). Six other states limit these unlawful acts
to non-felonies. Autz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 13-456 (1957); CAL PEN. CODE
§ 192; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 575 (1953) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.10 (1946);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-30-5 (1953) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-7 (1953).
Idaho refers to manslaughter in this respect as unlawful acts other than
rape, arson, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, mayhem, or any lawful act which
might produce death, committed in an unlawful manner. IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-4006 (1947). New Hampshire speaks of manslaughter in the first de-
gree as the act of a person engaged in the commission of any offense. N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 585:8 (1955). South Dakota classifies manslaughter in the first
degree as homicide committed by a person engaged in the commission of a
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. S.D. CODE § 13.2013 (1939). Texas
deems homicide committed in the perpetration of a misdemeanor to be "negli-
gent homicide." TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1242 (1948). Kentucky and Pennsylvania
appear to follow the common law.
The remaining states do not appear to have any specific statute covering
misdemeanor-manslaughter, but the majority of them do cover this area with
-case law.
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Necessity for Distinguishing Between Murder and Felony-Murder
and Manslaughter and Misdemeanor-Manslaughter
As previously shown, at common law, homicide resulting from
an assault committed with intent to inflict serious bodily harm was
classified as murder.51 Consequently there was no confusion between
degrees of murder if the same act were punishable as felony-murder
as well. But with the advent of the codified degrees of homicide it
became necessary to devise methods of preserving the distinctions
between those degrees. For example, in 1860 murder was divided
into two categories: murder in the first degree and murder in the
second degree.52 If assault were allowed to constitute one of the
underlying felonies for an indictment for felony-murder, the distinc-
tion between the two degrees would be obliterated. 3
In order to properly preserve the distinction between the degrees
of murder and between murder and manslaughter, it has been held
that the crime of assault merged with the homicide, thus preventing
a felony-murder indictment with assault alone as its foundation.54
Chief Judge Cardozo described the necessity for this holding by
stating that "[every] homicide . . . would occur in the commission
of a felony, with the result that intent to kill and deliberation and
premeditation would never be essential." 55 The Chief Judge went
on to state that "the felony that eliminates the quality of the intent
must be one that is independent of the homicide and of the assault
merged therein, as, e.g., robbery or larceny or burglary or rape." 56
The necessity of proper allocation of crimes is equally important
in the field of manslaughter. A homicide is defined by New York
Penal Law, Section 1050(1), as manslaughter in the first degree
51 State v. Calabrese, 107 N.J.L. 115, 151 AtI. 781 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
See text accompanying note 15 szapra.
42 See note 32 supra.
53 See People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927). "[E] very
intentional killing, by means of a dangerous weapon, regardless of deliberation
and premeditation, would constitute the crime of murder in the first degree,
since every such killing must be preceded by the direction of such a weapon
against the body of the person killed, which in itself would constitute a feloni-
ous assault." Id. at 148, 156 N.E. at 646.
54 People v. Luscomb, 292 N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d 469 (1944); People v.
Lazar, 271 N.Y. 27, 2 N.E.2d 32 (1936); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100,
102, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927) ; People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644
(1927); People v. Spohr, 206 N.Y. 516, 100 N.E. 444 (1912); People v.
Hfiter, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906); see Note, 10 ST. JoaN's LAw RZv.
253, 255-60 (1935).
55 People v. Moran, supra note 54, at 102, 158 N.E. at 36.
G Ibid. Judge Haight lucidly described this situation in People v. Hfiter,
supra note 54, at 244, 77 N.E. at 8-9, by stating: "It is apparent . . . that
the gist of the offense is the assault and when it is by violence inflicting an
injury to the person so assaulted, resulting in death, the act becomes a con-
stituent part of the homicide and is merged in the charge therefor."
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"when committed without a design to effect death . . . by a person
engaged in committing, or attempting to commit, a misdemeanor,
affecting the person or property, either of the person killed, or of
another ... ." If all assaults which amounted to a misdemeanor and
which resulted in death were punishable under the above-mentioned
statute, then section 1052(2) would become superfluous. This sec-
tion declares manslaughter to be in the second degree "when com-
mitted without a design to effect death . . . in the heat of passion,
but not by a dangerous weapon or by the use of means either cruel
or unusual ... ." The courts have applied the same reasoning here
as in felony-murder; assault being a constituent and inseparable part
of the act of killing, cannot at the same time be held to be an
independent misdemeanor sufficient to support a misdemeanor-
manslaughter charge.
Application of the Doctrine of Merger
In order to merge with a homicide, the underlying felony must
be an integral part of the homicide; so that upon an indictment for
the homicide the accused may be convicted of the felony. In Buel v.
People,5 7 the defendant allegedly strangled his victim while committing
the crime of rape. The defendant contended that the felony merged
with the homicide since violence was an essential element of the crime.
The court reasoned that:
If a person unintentionally kills another, while committing a minor felony
which is not an ingredient of the killing, the two felonies being so distinct
that they cannot be included in the same indictment, they are not merged, and
the accused may be convicted of [felony-murder] ... .58
In short, the felony, rape, does not merge with the homicide because
rape is not an ingredient of the homicide. When on trial for the
homicide, one cannot be convicted of rape.
The defendant in People v. Hiter 9 was accused of killing an
officer while resisting arrest.60 The court held that the offense was
assault in the second degree, and that therefore the act merged with
the homicide. Here there was one act which caused the homicide.
The court followed Buel and stated:
In order . . . to constitute murder in the first degree by the unintentional
killing of another while engaged in the commission of a felony, we think that
57 18 Hun 487 (3d Dep't 1879), aff'd, 78 N.Y. 492 (1879).
58 Id. at 493-94.
59 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906).
60 Assault in the second degree, then § 218(5) of the Penal Code of New
York, now § 242(5) of the Penal Law, was defined as assault "to prevent
or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court or
officer, or the lawful apprehension or detention of himself, or of any other
person .. " Ibid.
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while the violence may constitute a part of the homicide yet the other ele-
ments constituting the felony in which he is engaged must be so distinct from
that of the homicide as not to be an ingredient of the homicide, indictable
therewith or convictable thereunder. 61
Where the accused in the course of assaulting one person, assaults
and kills a second person, the first assault does not merge with the
subsequent homicide. 62  For example, A is in a room and is being
assaulted by X when B walks into the room. X continues his assault
on A and assaults and kills B. The two assaults are separate and
distinct. X killed B "while in the commission of" a felonious assault
on A; therefore he is guilty of felony-murder. 63 Similarly, an attempt
to commit a distinct felony, including an attempted assault, cannot
be held to merge with the homicide.
64
In summary, to be an integral part of the homicide and there-
fore merge into it, the underlying felony or misdemeanor must be an
assault which is the fatal assault. An assault with intent to kill
which results in the death of the person assaulted is an insufficient
basis for a charge of felony-murder. 65 Assault with intent to prevent
lawful arrest, as stated previously with reference to the Hiiter case,
merges, but a homicide committed in escaping from arrest for a
felony could result in a felony-murder charge since the underlying
felony, the escape, is distinct from the assault causing the homicide. 66
All assaults involve some degree of bodily harm but any law or prin-
ciple of law which Would permit every act of killing to be classified
as murder would be barbarous and unreasonable. Homicide is the
product of a fatal assault; without the assault there would be no
homicide. It is for this reason that it has been almost universally
held that the specific crime of assault merges with the homicide.
There have been many attempts made to broaden the use of the
doctrine of merger to include other crimes, such as rape, robbery,
and burglary, but the courts have vehemently opposed such an ex-
pansion. The defense in the Buel 7 case contended that force and
violence constituted the crime of rape, and therefore, the forceful
61 People v. Hifter, 184 N.Y. 237, 244, 77 N.E. 6, 8 (1906).
62 People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927).
63 Compare People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927), in which
the court found that the first assault had ended and the second (fatal) assault
was merged in the homicide. Therefore, neither could be the basis of a
felony-murder charge. See also Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958),
wherein the Court held that a single discharge of a shotgun, although affecting
more than one federal officer (the discharge wounded two officers) constituted
a single violation of the statute involved (18 U.S.C. § 111 (1958)).64 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1044(2).
65 Foster v. People, 50 N.Y. 598, 604, 609 (1872).
66 People v. Wilson, 145 N.Y. 628, 40 N.E. 392 (1895). See also People
v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930), and People v. Johnson, 110
N.Y. 134, 17 N.E. 684 (1888) (attempts to escape from state prisons).
67 78 N.Y. 492, 497 (1879).
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assault should merge with the homicide. The court emphatically re-
jected this assertion. "While force and violence constitute an im-
portant element of the crime of rape," the court explained, "they do
not constitute the entire body of that offence. The unlawful or
carnal knowledge is the essence of [rape]. ," 68 Robbery and
burglary will not merge 69 with the homicide because there are two
elements in both of these crimes, assault and larceny, the presence
of the latter preventing merger.70 An attempt to escape from a state
prison or from arrest for a felony does not merge.71 A recent at-
tempt to apply the doctrine of merger to kidnapping was made in
People v. La Marca.72  In a prosecution for kidnapping and murder,
the New York Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the
seizure, detention and depositing of the kidnapped infant in a wooded
area was but a felonious assault which merged in the homicide. The
court based this ruling on the reasoning that force and violence do
not constitute the entire body of the crime of kidnapping.73
While force and violence may constitute an important element of the crime
of kidnapping a child under the age of sixteen years (Penal Law, § 1250,
subd. 2), as they constitute an important element of the crimes of rape and
robbery, they do not constitute the entire body of that offense. A taking or
detaining of the infant with intent to keep or conceal it from the person having
the lawful care or control of it, or to extort or obtain money or reward for
the return or disposition of the child is the essence of that crime.74
Judge Sobel, in a dictum statement in People v. Conforti,7 declared
that the use of force or fear to collect a debt owed by the deceased to
one of the defendants may constitute the offense of extortion 7 or
attempted extortion.7 7 The judge added that the defendants might
be indicted for felony-murder or manslaughter in the second degree.
68 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
69 People v. Hfiter, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906) ; Cox v. People, 80 N.Y.
500 (1880).
70 See Cox v. People, supra note 69.
71 People v. Flanigan, 174 N.Y. 356, 66 N.E. 988 (1903) ; People v. Johnson,
110 N.Y. 134, 17 N.E. 684 (1888).
723 N.Y.2d 452, 144 N.E.2d 420, 165 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1957), modified,
3 N.Y.2d 933, 145 N.E.2d 892, 167 N.Y.S.2d 955, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 920(1958). LaMarca later brought a proceeding on a motion for a certificate of
probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1958), to appeal from an order
of a federal district court which denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the motion. United
States ex rel. LaMarca v. Denno, 257 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1958).
73 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1250.
74 People v. LaMarca, 3 N.Y.2d 452, 466, 144 N.E.2d 420, 428, 165 N.Y.S.2d
753, 765 (1957) (emphasis added). See People v. Koslow, 6 App. Div. 2d 713,
174 N.Y.S.2d 709 (2d Dep't 1958) (memorandum decision).
75 72 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Kings County Ct. 1947).76 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 850.
77 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 857.
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The doctrine of merger will not apply to reduce a possible in-
dictment for murder in the first degree to a lesser degree merely
because the killing was accidental.78 In People v. Udwin,79 the vic-
tim, a prisoner attempting to escape from a state prison, was acci-
dentally killed by a misdirected bullet discharged from a pistol held
by a fellow-conspirator. The court stated that "there may be no
intent to kill, but the violence having been perpetrated while engaged
in the robbery, burglary, or attempt to escape imprisonment, it is
murder in the first degree." 8o
The doctrine of merger has also been applied to misdemeanor-
manslaughter. The leading case is People v. Grieco,81 where the
defendant, while intoxicated, drove past a red light and through a
safety zone, killing one pedestrian and injuring a second. He was
indicted for misdemeanor-manslaughter on the theory that the mis-
demeanors of reckless driving 82 and operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated 83 were within the meaning of section 1050(1)
which defines misdemeanor-manslaughter. The Court of Appeals
held that the two misdemeanors did not come within the meaning of
section 1050(1). The court reasoned that immediately prior to the
accident the defendant was not "affecting the person or property.
either of the person killed, or of another .... ," 84 His reckless and
drunken operation of the automobile was not "affecting" anyone in
particular until the moment of impact with the deceased. Prior to
that it was merely "affecting society in general."
A moment before the collision the defendant's conduct constituted a crime,
a misdemeanor against society, against law and order, and against the People
of the State. The commission of the misdemeanor in which he was engaged
was not one affecting the person or property of deceased or of another. He
had not seen the deceased and did not know that she was present. The fact
that his automobile struck her could not instantly change his conduct so as
to make it an act affecting the person of the deceased and thereby make him
liable for the crime of manslaughter in the first degree.8 5
The court explained that if Grieco could have been convicted of
misdemeanor-manslaughter here, "every driver of an automobile,
who, while committing one of the offenses defined as a misdemeanor
78 People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930) ; People v. Slaver,
232 N.Y. 264, 133 N.E. 633 (1921); State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P.2d 1110(1932).
1-254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930).80 People v. Udwin, supra note 78, at 262, 172 N.E. at 491.
81266 N.Y. 48, 193 N.E. 634 (1934), reversing 241 App. Div. 790, 270 N.Y.
Supp. 1020 (4th Dep't 1934).
82 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAmc LAW § 58, now N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW
§ 1190.8 3 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRarsc LAW § 70(5), now N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC
LAW § 1192.84N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1050(1).
85 People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48, 51-52, 193 N.E. 634, 635 (1934).
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in the act [Vehicle and Traffic Law], accidentally causes the death
of a person will be guilty of . . .manslaughter in the first degree
no matter how thoughtless or unintentional the act." 86 Although
the court held the misdemeanors without section 1050(1), it never-
theless went on to discuss the doctrine of merger and concluded that
the misdemeanors merged.
The recent case of People v. Nicoll87 provides an interesting
comparison with the Grieco case. The defendant had caused the
death of another by shooting at his car during a chase on a highway.
The Appellate Division held, inter alia, that the misdemeanor of wil-
fully discharging a fire-arm in public merged with the resulting
homicide-not that it was without the ambit of section 1050(1), but
that it merged. The court stated that:
The wilful discharge of the firearm, constituting a violation of section
1906, was the very act which produced the death. It was simply the means
by which the assault was committed-the assault under a different name. As
was stated in People v. Hiter ..... "the gist of the offense is the assault",
which merges in the homicide .... 88
The Nicoll case, however, invites a new criticism. What is the
difference between drunken and reckless driving down a street and
the wilfull discharge of a firearm in public? They both appear to
"affect society in general" rather than a particular person, before
the homicide actually occurs. Why then did not the court follow the
Grieco rule and simply state that the misdemeanor did not come within
section 1050 (1) ? 89
86 Id. at 52, 193 N.E. at 635. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1053a, passed in 1936,
has eliminated this problem by separately classifying all unintentional vehicular
homicide.
S7 3 App. Div. 2d 64, 158 N.Y.S.2d 279 (4th Dep't 1956).
88 Id. at 72-73, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
89 The following misdemeanors have been held to support misdemeanor-
manslaughter indictments: People v. McDonald, 49 Hun 67, 1 N.Y. Supp. 703
(Sup. Ct. Gen. Term, 5th Dep't 1888) (N.Y. PEN. CoDE § 288, now N.Y. PEN.
LAW § 482-failure to provide for child); People ex rel. Taylor v. Seamon,
8 Misc. 152, 154, 29 N.Y. Supp. 329, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (N.Y. PEN. CoDE
§ 448, now N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1407-wilfully disturbing a lawful assembly or
meeting without lawful authority) (dictum); People v. Fitzsimmons, 34 N.Y.
Supp. 1102 (Ct. Sess. 1895) (N.Y. PEN. CODE §458, now N.Y. PEN. LAw
§ 1710-engaging in a prize fight) ; People v. Goydica, 122 Misc. 31, 203 N.Y.
Supp. 243 (Kings County Ct. 1923) (N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1530, 1532-creating
or maintaining a public nuisance) ; People v. Licenziata, 199 App. Div. 106.
191 N.Y. Supp. 619 (2d Dep't 1921) (N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1530(1)-selling
liquor containing wood alcohol) ; People v. Diamond, 95 Misc. 114, 160 N.Y.
Supp. 603 (Kings County Ct. 1916) (N.Y. LAB. LAW § 79(c), now §272, and
N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1275-failure to keep doors leading into and out of a factory
unfastened); People v. Nelson, 309 N.Y. 251, 128 N.E.2d 391 (1955) (N.Y.
MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 187-89, 304-failure to provide fire exits in an occunied
tenement building); People v. Nicoll, 3 App. Div. 2d 64, 68-71, 158 N.Y.S.2d
279, 285-87 (4th Dep't 1956) (N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1425(11)a--wilfully damaging
a motor vehicle).
Causal Relation Between the Underlying Crime
and the Homicide
In addition to merger, the factors of causation and duration are
significant in felony-murder. The homicide must be in pursuance
of the unlawful act and not merely coincident with it.90 There must
be some causal relation between the homicide and the underlying
felony in order for it to be regarded as felony-murder, especially
when there are two defendants of unequal culpability. Thus, the
Court of Appeals, in a per curiam decision, reversed a felony-murder
conviction with regard to one co-conspirator in People v. Elling9l
upon a showing that the defendant E shot S for a reason personal
to E and unrelated to the robbery. Thus, defendant B, who partici-
pated in the robbery but attempted to prevent the murder, was re-
leased from the felony-murder charge. Causality cannot be replaced
by contemporaneity. It is imperative to establish that death ensued
in consequence of the felony.92
In People v. Marendi9 the court instructed the jury that the
felony of carrying a dangerous weapon merged with the ensuing
homicide.94 An analysis of the decision, however, would seem to
On the other hand, the following misdemeanors have been declared to
merge with the homicide: People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48, 193 N.E. 634 (1934)
(N.Y. VEmIcLE & TRAFFic LAW § 58, now N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW§ 1190-reckless driving, and N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 70(5), now
N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 1192-driving while intoxicated); People v.
Marendi, 218 N.Y. 600, 107 N.E. 1058 (1915) (N.Y. Prx. LAW § 1897(4)-
carrying a dangerous weapon); People v. Nicoll, 3 App. Div. 2d 64, 158
N.Y.S.2d 279 (4th Dep't 1956) (N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1906-wilful discharge of
a fire-arm in public).
The N.Y. Law Revision Commission in 1937 listed the following misde-
meanors in the Penal Law which under the Grieco case might be deemed with-
in the scope of § 1050(1) : § 100 (adultery defined) ; § 405 (unlawfully enter-
ing building) ; § 482(1) (unlawfully omitting to provide for child); § 483-c(tattooing child under sixteen); § 580 (definition and punishment of con-
spiracy) ; § 1030 (hazing prohibited) ; § 1299 (petit larceny a misdemeanor) ;§ 1425 (malicious injury to, and destruction of, property); § 1433 (injury to
property, how punished) ; § 1710 (prize-fighting and sparring) ; § 2034 (forcible
entry and detainer) ; § 2035 (returning to take possession of lands after being
removed by legal process); § 2036 (unlawful intrusion on real property);§ 2070 (preventing performance of religious act). The Commission went on
to enumerate seventy misdemeanors of the Penal Law which in all likelihood
would not be the basis of a misdemeanor-manslaughter charge, e.g., § 483
(endangering life or health of a child). 1937 N.Y. LAW REvIS oN CoMmiissIoN
RE. 748-50, n.703.
9o See People v. Luscomb, 292 N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d 469 (1944) ; People v.
Elling, 289 N.Y. 419, 46 N.E.2d 501 (1943) (per curiam) ; People v. Marendi,
213 N.Y. 600, 107 N.E. 1058 (1915) ; Buel v. People, 78 N.Y. 492 (1879).
91289 N.Y. 419, 46 N.E.2d 501 (1943) (per curiam).
92 Buel v. People, 78 N.Y. 492, 497 (1879).
93 213 N.Y. 600, 107 N.E. 1058 (1915).
4 Id. at 606, 107 N.E. 1059-60. See N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1897(4). The offense
is a felony when committed by second offenders.
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indicate that the court was referring to the lack of causality between
the felony and the homicide rather than the felony merging with the
homicide. So too, in the Grieco case, the court, after an analysis of
the merger doctrine as applied to felony-murder, emphatically stated
that their conclusion was that the misdemeanors merged.95 This, in
the face of the court's extended primary holding that subject mis-
demeanors were not within the misdemeanor-manslaughter statute,
appears unnecessary, if not contradictory. Can the misdemeanors be
without the statute-not affect the person or property of the deceased.
or of another-yet still be held to merge? It would seem that the
antithesis would be more logical and proper. Only when the offense
is deemed within the statute-that is, affecting a particular person or
his property before the homicide occurs-that the question of whether
the misdemeanor merges arises. So, perhaps the Grieco court too
was referring to causality rather than merger. This analysis would
preserve the traditional concept of merger and prevent an extension
which would include all misdemeanors which only affected "society
in general."
The New York decisions, in defining the "duration" factor in
felony-murder, have declared that the felony must be so related to
the homicide as to justify a jury in finding that the homicide was
committed in the actual course of the felony.96 A burglar, who at
the time of the homicide had abandoned the loot and was in flight.
was not indictable under the felony-murder provision because the
felony had ended prior to the homicidef 7
People v. Nelson
A case which drew considerable criticism in the field of
misdemeanor-manslaughter was People v. Nelson." The defendant
was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree (misdemeanor-
manslaughter) and manslaughter in the second degree (culpable neg-
ligence manslaughter) for failing to provide adequate fire protection
95 People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48, 54, 193 N.E. 634, 639 (1934).
96 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1044(2) : "[B]y a person engaged in the commission
of, or in an attempt to commit a felony.... ." People v. Ryan, 263 N.Y. 298,
189 N.E. 225 (1934); People v. Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382, 125 N.E. 535 (1919).
A person who puts a fatally destructive force in motion during the commis-
sion of a felony should not be allowed to avoid responsibility for the ensuing
death. See People v. Keshner, 304 N.Y. 968, 110 N.E.2d 892 (memorandum
decision), motion for reargument denied, 305 N.Y. 553, 111 N.E.2d 246 (1953).
97 People v. Hilter, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906). In other jurisdictions,
the requirement that the homicide be in consequence of the felony, is necessary.
State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932); Pleimling v. State, 46
Wis. 516, 1 N.W. 278 (1879) (death resulting from fire during the felony of
rape was not felony-murder; the fire was not the consequence of the rape).
98309 N.Y. 231, 128 N.E.2d 391 (1955). See 24 FORDHAM L. RPv. 688(1956); 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1128 (1956).
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in his multiple dwelling, a misdemeanor under the Multiple Dwelling
Law. 9 As a result of his negligence two persons were killed in a
fire. The defendant had not been personally notified of the viola-
tion. 00 The Court of Appeals upheld his conviction of misdemeanor-
manslaughter, stating that this "constituted a continuing misdemeanor
'affecting the person ... killed.' "101 The court rejected any appli-
cation of the merger doctrine, holding that the situation before them
was dissimilar to a continuing assault resulting in death. 02
The criticism of the situation mainly involved the conviction of
manslaughter in the first degree for a nalum prohibitum misde-
meanor.' 03 Under the doctrine of constructive intent,0 4 which
supplies the foundation .for felony-murder and misdemeanor-
manslaughter, one who undesignedly causes the death of another
during the intentional commission of an unlawful act, will be deemed
in law to have intended such death.'05 Malum prohibitum acts have
been made misdemeanors by statute regardless of the lack of wrongful
intention. It would appear to follow that the absence of intent which
can be transferred to the homicide would preclude the finding of the
mens rea necessary for a conviction. 0 6
Sumvary and Conclusion
When on trial for felony-murder or misdemeanor-manslaughter,
the theory is that the defendant may be separately convicted of both
the lesser crime and the homicide, i.e., convicted of either the under-
lying offense or the homicide and acquitted of the other, or acquitted
of both the charges. Although assault, resulting in death, cannot be
the felony or the misdemeanor constituting felony-murder or mis-
demeanor-manslaughter, the defendant could theoretically be found
guilty of an assault after being acquitted on the homicide. In illus-
tration, if A was indicted for manslaughter in the second degree for
09 N.Y. MULT. DwEzL.. LAW §§ 187, 188, 189, 304.100 Notification is necessary for conviction according to the Multiple Dwelling
Law. N.Y. MuLr. DwE.L. LAW § 326.
1 People v. Nelson, 309 N.Y. 231, 236, 128 N.E.2d 391, 393 (1955).
102 Ibid. People v. Vollmer, 299 N.Y. 347, 87 N.E.2d 291 (1949); People
v. Luscomb, 292 N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d 469 (1944).
103 See 3 FORTNIGHTLY L.J. 257-58 (1934) ; 23 Micu. L. REV. 176 (1924).
104 Briefly put, the theory is that the intent to commit the underlying felony
or misdemeanor is sufficient ground to regard any homicide occurring in pur-
suance thereof as punishable by the severe penalty usually reserved for homi-
cides done with a specific criminal intent toward the victim. See text follow-
ing note 13 supra.
105 See Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873).
106 See WHARToN, Ho MICIDE (3d ed. 1907). "But while homicide perpetrated
in the commission of some unlawful act is manslaughter, though the death of
the person killed was not intended, yet the unlawful act must be wilful, and
not a mere misadventure." Id. § 213. Contra, People v. Diamond, 95 Misc.
114, 160 N.Y. Supp. 603 (Kings County Ct. 1916). The court declared: "It
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the killing of B, in the heat of passion, 0 7 while engaged in a fist-fight
with B, in theory A could be acquitted of the homicide, by a reason-
able doubt being entertained by the jury whether or not the fight
caused B's death, and yet be convicted of assault in the third degree.' 08
The reasoning behind this circumstance is the heart of the doctrine
of merger itself. Assault merges with the homicide because it is a
necessary ingredient of the homicide, and for this reason, when one
is on trial for murder and manslaughter, he is also on trial for assault.
In New York and similar jurisdictions all felonies with the ex-
ception of assault have been held not to merge with the homicide:
in other jurisdictions those felonies which are specifically enumerated
will not merge, and seemingly all other felonies will merge with the
homicide or not be included within the statutes pertaining to murder
in the first degree. Unfortunately, however, no such talismanic for-
mula may be drafted for misdemeanor-manslaughter. Several juris-
dictions follow New York but most states follow the common law
and allow "unlawful acts" to constitute misdemeanor-manslaughter.
Just what "unlawful acts" will satisfy the various provisions is a
study within itself.
With regard to misdemeanor-manslaughter, the courts attempt
to preserve the traditional concept of merger although there is some
confusion as to this in the misdemeanor-manslaughter area. This
confusion can be avoided if the courts first determine whether the
misdemeanors "affect the person or property of the deceased, or of
another," as distinguished from "affecting society in general," and
if the misdemeanors qualify, only then apply the merger doctrine.
A possible answer to the confusion of determining which felonies and
misdemeanors merge to prevent felony-murder charges may be found
in the employment of the term "efficient cause." Using this concept,
the courts determine if the underlying offense was "the efficient
cause" of the homicide or merely contributed collaterally to the homi-
cide. Thus, in a fatal assault, it is the act of the assault itself which
produces the homicide. So also in the area of neglect, if it is the act
of neglect itself which causes the homicide, then the neglect should
merge within the homicide. For example, if a parent fails to provide
food for its child for an extended period of time, and the child dies
of starvation, the parental neglect and the homicide should merge. 0 9
seems to me that under our statute there are no exceptions, but that any one
would be guilty of manslaughter who, while engaged in the commission of a
misdemeanor, brings about the death of another, irrespective of the fact that
it was malum prohibitum or malum in se." Id. at 120, 160 N.Y. Supp. at 607.
107 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1052 (2).108 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 244.
109 In a very early case, People v. McDonald, 49 Hun 67, 1 N.Y. Supp. 703
(Sup. Ct. Gen. Term, 5th Dep't 1888), a mother was indicted for misdemeanor-
manslaughter based on a violation of the predecessor of N.Y. PEN. CODE; § 482
(failure to provide for a child). She was convicted of the misdemeanor only;
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More and more misdemeanors are being created yearly, the bulk
of which are mala prohibita. As the greatest number of misdemeanors
qualify under misdemeanor-manslaughter, fewer manage to avoid the
more severe punishment for manslaughter in the first degree by com-
ing within manslaughter in the second degree, culpable negligence-
manslaughter. Cases of accidents and misfortunes or omissions, de-
void of criminal intent, rise to the level of misdemeanor-manslaughter
when the legislature so deems. This imposes greater sanctions on
crimes which require a lesser degree of culpability than offenses
within a lesser degree of manslaughter. Misdemeanor-manslaughter
could be established with proof of ordinary negligence, where culpable
negligence must be shown to convict for manslaughter in the second
degree.
To make the situation more harmonious with the concept of
having the punishment befit the crime, either legislative revision to
specifically enumerate the qualifying misdemeanors or judicial re-
shaping to limit the offenses to those inala in se appears necessary.
Knowledge and intent should be two important determinants in any
consideration of this kind. Perhaps Mr. Justice Van Voorhis' state-
ment in his dissent in People v. Nelson would serve as a good guide:
Death caused by a persop "engaged in committing a misdemeanor" was
designed to mean by a person consciously engaged in committing the
misdemeanor."10
PROPOSED SECTION 735 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: AN
IMPLICATION CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES
OF GRATUITOUS ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME?
A revision of Section 735 of the Internal Revenue Code in the
recently proposed "Trust and Partnership Income Tax Revision Bill
of 1960" 1 was intended to clarify the treatment of distributed part-
but the indictment tacitly recognized the validity of the misdemeanor-
manslaughter charge. The case is somewhat contradictory, however, in that
the conviction of the misdemeanor alone under the indictment for misdemeanor-
manslaughter is an example of the language used by the Court of Appeals in
describing merger in regard to felony-murder. Felonies that are "convictable
under" a charge of the homicide resulting from them have been held to merge
and not support a felony-murder indictment. People v. Hiiter, 184 N.Y. 237,
77 N.E. 6 (1906).
110 309 N.Y. 231, 241, 128 N.E.2d 391, 396 (1955) (emphasis added).
I H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Proposed § 735]. See H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (1960).
1960 ]
